We present a translation of the interview with political scientist Arman Grigoryan to the CASPIA analytical center (abridged):
- Over the past five years, the South Caucasus has changed more than in the previous thirty years. How would you characterize the new architecture of regional security?
- As transitional, although this claim can also be debated. Until the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, Russia had, if not a strategic monopoly, then strategic leadership in the region. The West and Turkey were certainly present in the South Caucasus and competing with Russia for influence, but the dominant power was indeed Russia.
Since 2022, the status quo has significantly destabilized due to two interconnected factors. First, Russia became embroiled in a protracted and costly conflict, which forced it to concentrate its main resources and political attention there. Second, if before the war in Ukraine, the relations between Russia and the West could be characterized as conflictual and competitive, after 2022 they effectively transformed into a confrontation based on the principle of a “zero-sum game”.
We are still at the epicenter of this confrontation and do not know how it will end. In the meantime, it is premature to speak of an established architecture of security. For now, it can only be stated that the previous status quo has collapsed, and the new order has yet to be formed. It should also be noted that the ongoing war in the Middle East will have a significant impact on the formation of a new architecture of security in the South Caucasus, regardless of what its outcome will be.
- How does the Armenian expert community perceive the concept of “Real Armenia” proposed by Nikol Pashinyan today? Do you think that Armenian society is psychologically ready to finally close the issue of Karabakh?
- One thing can be said for sure: none of the leading political parties presented a revanchist agenda in the last elections. Probably, this reflects the prevailing public sentiments in the country.
- Why, despite the defeat in Karabakh and numerous internal crises, did Pashinyan manage to retain the trust of a significant part of society again?
- The answer is quite simple. The main divide in Armenian politics runs between the “former” and the “present”. A significant part of Armenian society is so afraid of the return of the former elite that it continues to vote for Pashinyan, despite the defeat in Karabakh and his generally unsatisfactory governance results.
You might argue and say that a new political force emerged that challenged Pashinyan — Samvel Karapetyan’s party. However, Karapetyan also had the image of a politician associated with the “former” ones. Moreover, there were questions regarding the constitutionality of his possible participation in the elections. Finally, he and his team demonstrated surprising political incompetence.
They failed to offer a convincing alternative to the policies of the current government. Their election campaign essentially boiled down to promises of creating new jobs, which were not backed by any coherent economic reform program. It is also disappointing that they rejected several proposals from other political forces to form a united opposition front, although they themselves should have sought such consolidation.
- If a peace treaty is signed, will it mark the end of the conflict or merely the beginning of a new phase of competition? Which provisions of the future peace treaty may be the most difficult to implement?
- I am not sure that the signing of a peace treaty will in itself put an end to the conflict. In any case, Baku has repeatedly stated that the issues concerning Azerbaijan's interests in relations with Armenia are not limited to the provisions of the peace treaty draft.
The use of the term “Western Azerbaijan”, the discussion of the possible resettlement of 300,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia, as well as proposals regarding the special regime of operation of the “Zangezur corridor” remain sensitive issues that continue to be discussed in the context of Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement.
An additional factor is the ongoing imbalance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which continues to influence the negotiation process, as well as the Armenian government's path of diversifying its foreign policy and strategic partnerships.
Arman GrigoryanPhoto: Mediamax
In my opinion, this approach reflects Yerevan's desire to adapt its security system to new regional realities. At the same time, it is currently difficult to assess how effectively cooperation with Western partners can provide the expected long-term security guarantees.
- To what extent is this a strategic choice, and to what extent is it forced adaptation? Can Armenia not maintain working relations with Russia while deepening cooperation with the West?
- From the very first days of independence, Armenia has tried to build its foreign policy in this way. However, today the situation has changed for two reasons.
First, the current leadership of Armenia clearly prioritizes integration with the West and views close relations with Russia as a threat to Armenian sovereignty. In other words, we are talking about a strategic choice, rather than forced adaptation.
Second, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain good relations with both Russia and the West against the backdrop of open confrontation between them and the growing pressure from both sides with demands for a clear choice.
- What needs to happen for there to be at least minimal strategic trust between Baku and Yerevan?
- First of all, I would like to note that strategic trust cannot be created solely by signing documents. Documents are certainly important, but they alone cannot ensure peace, trust, and stability.
In the long term, this will only be possible when both societies stop perceiving each other as enemies and start treating each other as ordinary neighbors.
For example, the relations between Armenia and Georgia can serve as an example. Despite existing disagreements and periodically emerging conflicts, neither side, even at a subconscious level, perceives the other as a threat or an attractive target for coercive pressure. Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan will be far from such a model for a long time. Achieving this will take time, and in the short term, external security guarantees will be needed.
Unfortunately, today we see a tendency to abandon Russia as a potential security guarantor without offering any full-fledged alternative, as well as attempts to achieve large-scale results in the shortest possible time. In my opinion, such an approach carries serious risks.
- How do you see Armenia's place in ten years: in the European political space, in Eurasian integration, or as a state pursuing a multi-vector policy?
- This largely depends on how the current geopolitical confrontation between the West and, on the one hand, Russia and Iran, on the other, will end. Regardless of its outcome, Armenia will likely have to make a strategic choice. I am not sure that a multi-vector policy can remain a sustainable strategy in the long term under the conditions of a more polarized international order.
