We present a translation of the article by Kamran Bokhari, senior fellow at the Middle East Policy Council and senior director at the Washington-based New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, titled Russia Lost Armenia. So Did Iran.
Kamran Bokhari
The upcoming constitutional referendum in Armenia could pose a serious challenge for Tehran, which is interested in maintaining tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Russia's attempts to restore its control over the South Caucasus are failing, and the consequences are being felt beyond Moscow's borders. Iran has also effectively lost its northern foothold, conceding it to the US-Turkey-Azerbaijan axis, and has yet to find effective means of counteraction. Even while remaining a likely target of Iranian attacks, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf increasingly view the Transcaucasian region as an important tool for countering the influence of the Islamic Republic. What has long been considered a zone of influence for Russia and Iran is rapidly turning into a corridor for their rivals.
The Ukrainian strike on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea on July 31 showed that Kyiv is expanding military operations beyond the battlefield, targeting key logistical infrastructures of the Russia-Iran partnership. By applying force in the Caspian Sea, Ukraine challenged the corridor that Moscow and Tehran considered a safe route for the transportation of military cargo and dual-use goods.
In a broader sense, this incident highlighted the growing interconnectedness between European and Middle Eastern theaters. Iran's support for Russia has made it a more immediate target of Ukrainian strikes. At the same time, the strike raised the likelihood that the Caspian Sea could become yet another conflict zone, linking the war in Ukraine with a broader regional confrontation involving Iran.
Photo: REUTERS
The Iranian regime's information campaign seeks to create the impression of victory, presenting the country as having "defeated" the US and Israel in confrontation. However, the strategic reality tells a different story. A Russia significantly weakened by war is no longer able to provide the northern buffer that Iran has long relied upon. As a result, the northern borders of the Islamic Republic have become more vulnerable. At the same time, Iran's relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are at an unprecedentedly tense level. The situation has particularly escalated after the failure of the memorandum of understanding on June 17, when Washington resumed strikes against Iran in response to Tehran's attacks on three vessels on July 8.
Since then, the United States has struck Iran several times, gradually expanding the range of targets from military facilities to bridges, airports, and energy infrastructure.
In response, Iran has also expanded the geography of the conflict. It has struck electricity and water supply facilities in Kuwait, and on July 17 attacked an American military base in Jordan, resulting in the deaths of three American servicemen.
The Houthis, supported by Iran, fired missiles at Saudi Arabia on July 13, and on July 17 launched a ballistic missile at an American military base. Further escalation of the security situation has more directly involved nuclear-armed Pakistan. Islamabad has warned Tehran that any new attack on Saudi territory, whether carried out by Iran or the Houthis, will trigger its obligations under the mutual defense agreement signed with Riyadh in 2025.
Photo: REUTERS
Pakistan and Kuwait are discussing expanding defense cooperation. A possible agreement could include troop deployments, cooperation in fighter aviation and air defense in exchange for deepening energy ties and expanding investments.
Despite Tehran's confident statements, Iran has come under pressure from almost all directions, and the results of the parliamentary elections held in Armenia on June 7 are also part of this unfavorable trend. The victory of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was a clear rejection by society of political forces associated with the Kremlin and a serious blow to Moscow's efforts to form a more friendly government in Yerevan. At the same time, it was also a failure for Tehran, whose regional strategy was largely based on the same geopolitical axis aimed at countering Western and Turkish influence. Pashinyan's electoral base rejected precisely that approach.
However, the elections are not an end but the beginning of a new phase. Future developments will show whether Armenia's gradual westward shift will become irreversible and whether it will be possible to finally establish stable peace with Azerbaijan. No less important is whether the United States can turn this opportunity into long-term influence in a region that Russia has long viewed as its sphere of influence and Iran as a vital strategic land bridge. Washington and its Gulf allies must closely monitor developments in Armenia and actively encourage Yerevan to continue on its chosen path.
Pashinyan's party, the Civil Contract, received about 49.8 percent of the votes. Although it retained a majority, it lost seven mandates from the previous 71 mandates. The opposition contested the election results, mobilized its supporters, and appealed to the Constitutional Court. However, on July 4, the court rejected the claim, leaving the election results unchanged.
This process unfolds against a backdrop of delicate diplomatic circumstances. Pashinyan's first foreign visit after the elections was to Russia on July 6, where he met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. Mishustin's messages indicated that Moscow is closely monitoring the steps of Armenia's new government, especially considering the pro-Western orientation of the campaign. The Kremlin is likely to continue trying to deepen the existing political divides within Armenian society, focusing particularly on attempts to thwart potential initiatives to change Armenia's Constitution.
Photo: Government of Armenia
Moscow's next goal after the electoral defeat of its allied political forces in Armenia will be to prevent the constitutional changes initiated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. These changes are necessary for the final signing of the peace treaty with Azerbaijan, agreed upon in 2025. The Civil Contract did not obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament to make constitutional changes, and this moment is of key importance. The core of the issue lies in the preamble of Armenia's current Constitution, which refers to the Declaration of Independence of 1991. This declaration was adopted during the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Armenia, Azerbaijan, and several other republics of the South Caucasus and Eurasia proclaimed their independence.
The preamble of the Constitution mentions the reunification of Armenia and "Nagorno-Karabakh." "Nagorno-Karabakh" is a toponym of Russian origin. This territory is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, as reflected in the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884 from 1993.
The main problem with Armenia's current Constitution is that any peace agreement signed by Nikol Pashinyan's government may not be binding for future authorities if they attempt to make territorial claims on Karabakh, referring to constitutional provisions. If the Constitution is not amended, the peace agreement will remain merely a temporary arrangement and will not become the basis for long-term peace.
Photo: Fotolur
Having a convincing mandate from voters, Nikol Pashinyan is politically well-positioned to present the constitutional referendum as a nationwide initiative aimed at establishing peace. For Pashinyan, the most realistic option is not to expect cooperation from the opposition, as this is nearly impossible. Instead, he is likely to try to form limited cooperation on specific issues. By presenting these changes not as political concessions but as necessary technical prerequisites for the resolution of international relations, he lowers the political cost for opposition pragmatic deputies to support them or at least abstain from voting.
This is where Washington comes into play. The Trump administration could provide the necessary diplomatic support by leveraging its relationships with Yerevan and Baku to present the need for constitutional changes as part of a broader settlement related to the "Trump path." Supporting the constitutional process in Armenia is not only effective regional diplomacy but also directly aligns with US strategic interests in a context where Russia and Iran have limited influence in the South Caucasus. Strengthening peace with Western support, developing infrastructure, and promoting institutional reforms could enhance American influence, making it more stable and long-term than any single political cycle of an administration.
The opportunities are significant: resolving one of the most complex and protracted frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, a more secure and prosperous Armenia, and proof that unresolved disputes inherited from the Soviet era can be finally resolved rather than endlessly passed on to the next generation. Moscow is already taking steps to prevent this prospect, while Tehran watches developments with concern. Now the key question is whether Washington will work with the same consistency to turn this opportunity into reality.
