We present the Armenian translation of the article Rewiring the South Caucasus, published on the website of the European Security and Defence research institution:
David Lidel
For a long time, Europe viewed the South Caucasus primarily through a narrow security prism as a region shaped by Russian influence, energy vulnerability, and persistent instability due to the "frozen conflicts" in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. However, today the region is rapidly transforming, gaining greater strategic significance. Once considered the periphery of Europe, the South Caucasus is gradually becoming an important geopolitical crossroads connecting Europe with Central Asia and regions beyond.
At the heart of this transformation is the so-called TRIPP program—a transport and communication infrastructure development initiative that could reshape the regional balance of power and alter Europe’s strategic relations with the South Caucasus.
While in recent years much of the international attention has focused on military and hard security issues, given the decades-long conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, current geopolitical realities are largely related to infrastructure, transport and energy transit routes, corridors, and the broader strategic influence formed through them. The South Caucasus has now become part of a wider geopolitical competition regarding how Europe can more effectively connect with Asia in a newly emerging and more complex geopolitical environment.
It is the war in Ukraine that has accelerated this dynamic transformation. European governments and businesses have begun to seek alternatives to Russian transit routes, while growing instability around maritime routes has further increased interest in land connections between Europe and Asia. As a result, the so-called "Middle Corridor," which connects Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey, is gradually transforming from a theoretical alternative into a strategic priority.
In this rapidly evolving context, Armenia's geographical position has gained greater importance.
Photo: Government of Armenia
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presents Armenia not as an isolated post-Soviet state surrounded by hostile neighbors, but as a potential strategic link between Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. His government’s "Peace Crossroads" initiative aims to reopen and reactivate regional rail, road, and trade routes that have been inactive for decades, most of which were closed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of conflict with Azerbaijan in the early 1990s.
Pashinyan recently noted that if Armenia's borders are reopened with Turkey and Azerbaijan, the country’s geographical position could change overnight. A state characterized by blockade and isolation could become a bridge connecting regions.
The broader vision of TRIPP includes roads, logistics hubs, fiber optic cables, energy interconnections, pipelines, and other important infrastructures aimed at linking Europe with Central Asia. For the governments of Washington, Brussels, Ankara, and Central Asia, the South Caucasus is becoming part of broader efforts to diversify transport networks that bypass Russian territory and reduce dependence on vulnerable maritime routes.
Recent developments have only deepened this dynamic. In May 2026, Armenia and Iran moved towards forming a strategic partnership encompassing transport, infrastructure, and broader economic cooperation, highlighting Tehran’s determination not to be excluded from developing connectivity programs in the region. For Iran, the South Caucasus is no longer just a neighboring region but an important component of broader geopolitical competition where the interests of the United States, Israel, and Turkey intersect, as well as the emerging new transit routes in Eurasia.
The parliamentary elections held in Armenia in June 2026 take on much greater significance than just an internal political event. They effectively serve as a referendum on Armenia's future geopolitical orientation.
Pashinyan's victory was interpreted not only as an internal political success but also as a factual confirmation of the government’s direction towards reorienting Armenia after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia’s failure to fulfill its obligations as the main guarantor of Armenia’s security. Despite criticism from nationalist and pro-Russian forces, voters ultimately supported the political leadership advocating for regional settlement, expansion of economic ties, and a more diversified foreign policy.
For Moscow, this outcome is yet another setback in a region long considered part of Russia's traditional sphere of influence in the Caucasus. However, the elections in Armenia do not signify the end of Russian influence. Russia remains closely tied to Armenia's economy and energy system and continues to be an important component of the country's security architecture, while the presence of Russian armed forces and border guards provides Moscow with significant levers of influence.
Nevertheless, Russia's ability to exert influence over Armenia's strategic decisions is gradually diminishing. The broader significance of the recent election results extends far beyond Armenia's borders. In Brussels and Washington, it is likely to be perceived as confirmation that Yerevan is committed to closer political and economic cooperation with Western partners. It will also give new momentum to the prospects of regional initiatives such as the US-led TRIPP and the development of the "Middle Corridor." Both imply a stable government in Yerevan that is ready to both compromise with neighbors and withstand possible pressures.
For Europe, Yerevan's strategic reorientation creates a significant opportunity as Brussels increasingly values the South Caucasus not only in terms of regional stability but also in strengthening the resilience of the European economy and supply chains.
For the EU, the South Caucasus is now at the intersection of several strategic priorities. The region already plays an important role in Europe’s energy diversification strategy through the Southern Gas Corridor, which delivers Azerbaijani natural gas to European markets. In conditions where Europe seeks to reduce strategic dependencies formed as a result of the war in Ukraine, expanding regional connections also becomes an important component of security.
It is the "Middle Corridor" that can offer Europe an alternative east-west route, completely bypassing Russia. Although its capacity still significantly lags behind both maritime shipments and the northern transit route that passed through Russia before the war, its geopolitical value has sharply increased after the outbreak of large-scale war in Ukraine in 2022.
The Middle Corridor also aligns with key European strategic priorities regarding key raw materials, supply chain resilience, and deepening economic ties with Central Asia. For instance, Kazakhstan, which seeks to diversify its export routes westward, is showing increasing interest in developing transport links through the South Caucasus, including creating possible connections with the infrastructure of the Middle Corridor through Armenia.
At the same time, growing instability in other parts of the region has further increased Armenia's strategic significance for Western partners. Georgia, long considered a key transit state connecting the West with the Black Sea, has faced increasing criticism for democratic backsliding and authoritarian trends in recent years.
Concerns in Brussels and Washington that Tbilisi may gradually drift away from its Euro-Atlantic orientation have further complicated Western strategic planning regarding the Middle Corridor and regional connectivity.
However, Europe’s ambitions in this region also carry risks, particularly because the EU’s economic interests are expanding here faster than its geopolitical levers. Brussels can offer funding, investment, diplomatic engagement, and limited mandates for small observer missions, but ultimately the Union lacks the hard tools that can decisively influence the formation of the security environment in a region like the South Caucasus. In this regard, the South Caucasus differs from the Western Balkans.
It is not surprising that Ankara has become one of the main geopolitical stakeholders in the region's transformation. Turkey has long supported the expansion of east-west transit routes through the region and views the "Middle Corridor" as a key component of its ambitions to become a major logistics and energy hub in Eurasia. The reopening of the border between Armenia and Turkey will provide Ankara with direct land connectivity to Central Asia.
It should also be noted that Turkey's military partnership with Azerbaijan has already significantly altered the balance of power in the region. The successes of Azerbaijan's military operations in 2020 and 2023 demonstrated the effectiveness of Turkish military support, including the supply of drones, joint exercises, and operational cooperation. Since then, Ankara's influence in the South Caucasus has continued to grow, while Russia's former dominant position in the region has gradually weakened.
For Europe, Ankara's role in European connectivity projects is becoming increasingly important, particularly in terms of accessing Central Asia and developing alternative trade routes. However, as for many years, existing tensions between Turkey and several European countries continue to complicate their relations.
Nevertheless, geography works in Ankara's favor. Any significant east-west corridor that connects Europe with Central Asia through the South Caucasus inevitably increases Ankara's strategic importance for both NATO and the EU.
Despite the widespread geopolitical enthusiasm surrounding TRIPP and the "Middle Corridor," several structural weaknesses underlying them continue to persist. The volume of freight transportation has sharply increased since 2022, but the route still serves only a fraction of the volumes that were previously transported through Russia's Northern Corridor. Several key infrastructure projects continue to be delayed, particularly the long-awaited Anaklia deep-sea port project in Georgia. At the same time, fragmented customs systems, limited railway capacities, and existing port and ferry restrictions in the Caspian Sea continue to hinder the scaling of the corridor. The gradual decline in the water level of the Caspian Sea and growing environmental concerns also create further long-term uncertainty around the corridor's viability.
The final peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan has not yet been ratified. Border disputes continue, infrastructure gaps remain, and internal political opposition in Armenia may complicate the process of constitutional changes necessary for the implementation of the emerging peace framework.
As mentioned above, the South Caucasus is increasingly integrating into Europe’s broader strategic environment. At the same time, issues of connectivity, energy infrastructure, digital networks, and trade corridors are now deeply interconnected with security and geopolitical influence issues.
This region is not only shaping a trade and transport project but also a broader competition around the future architecture of Eurasian connectivity after the war in Ukraine. This competition intersects not only with the diminishing influence of Russia in the region but also with the deepening confrontation between Iran and the West, growing instability in Georgia, and the efforts of the United States to strengthen alternative geopolitical and economic corridors linking Europe with Central Asia.
Whether TRIPP succeeds or not, the strategic direction is already clear: the geopolitical map between Europe and Asia is being redrawn, and the South Caucasus is increasingly moving towards the center of this process. However, for now, the "Middle Corridor" remains a strategic alternative, the long-term viability of which is still uncertain.
Translation by Diana Manukyan
This article has been translated and published with the support of the Gulbenkian Foundation: the views expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Gulbenkian Foundation or Mediamax.
